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Abstract
Though risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution have been
the subjects of careful scrutiny when calibrating preferences, the long-run risks
literature as well as the broader literature using recursive utility to address asset
pricing puzzles have ignored the full implications of their parameter specica-
tions. Recursive utility implies that the temporal resolution of risk matters and a
quantitative assessment of how much it matters should be part of the calibration
process. This paper gives a sense of the magnitudes of implied timing premia.
Its objective is to inject temporal resolution of risk into the discussion of the
quantitative properties of long-run risks and related models.
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20, 2013.1 Introduction
The long-run risks model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) has delivered a unied explanation
of several otherwise puzzling aspects of asset markets.1 Since Mehra and Prescott
(1985) posed the equity premium puzzle, it has been understood that the asset market
puzzles are quantitative and that an explanation must be consistent with observations
in other markets and also with introspection. Imposing such discipline led Mehra and
Prescott to exclude rationalization of the observed equity premium by levels of risk
aversion exceeding their well known upper bound of 10. This bound on risk aversion
has been largely respected since, including in long-run risk models (henceforth LRR).
However, we suggest in this paper that quantitative discipline has been lax in another
equally important aspect of the long-run risks model.
As a representative agent model, LRR has two key components|the endowment
process and preferences. The former is modeled as having a persistent predictable
component for consumption growth and its volatility; it will be described more precisely
below. The representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989;
Weil, 1990), which permit a partial disentangling of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS) and the coecient of relative risk aversion (RRA). Denoting time t
consumption by ct, continuation utilities Ut satisfy the recursion
U

t = (1   )c

t + 

Et(U

t+1)
= ; (1)
when  6= 0, and otherwise
logUt = (1   )logct +  log

Et(U

t+1)
1= : (2)
We assume that  < 1, 0 6=  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The utility of a deterministic
1In his opening remarks, Bansal (2007) lists the following puzzles: the level of equity premium,
asset price volatility, the large cross-sectional dierences in average returns across equity portfolios
such as value and growth portfolios, and in bond and foreign exchange markets, the violations of
the expectations hypothesis and the ensuing return predictability that is quantitatively dicult to
explain. He then writes: \What risks and investor concerns can provide a unied explanation for these
asset market facts? One potential explanation of all these anomalies is the long-run risks model." For
elaboration and many additional references see Bansal (2007), Piazzesi and Schneider (2007), Hansen,
Heaton, and Li (2008), Colacito and Croce (2011) and Chen (2010).
2consumption path is in the CES class with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
EIS =
1
1   
:
Epstein and Zin (1989) show that 1    is the measure of relative risk aversion for
timeless wealth gambles and also for suitable gambles in consumption where all risk is
resolved at a single instant, justifying thereby the identication
RRA = 1   :
The noted disentangling is possible because a decrease in  increases risk aversion with-
out aecting the attitude towards consumption smoothing over time given certainty,
unlike in the standard additive power utility model where  = . With these inter-
pretations of  and , parameter values in the LRR literature are specied with due
care paid to evidence about the elasticity of substitution and the degree of risk aver-
sion. However, as is clear from the theoretical literature,  and  aect also another
aspect of preference in addition to the EIS and RRA. Clearly, judging the plausibility
of parameter values requires that one consider their full quantitative implications for
all dimensions of preference.
The above model of utility belongs to the recursive class developed by Kreps and
Porteus (1978) in order to model noninderence to the way in which a given risk
resolves over time. For a simple example, suppose that consumption is xed and
certain in periods 0 and 1, and that it will be constant thereafter either at a high level
or at a low level, depending on the outcome of the toss of an unbiased coin. Do you
care whether the coin is tossed at t = 1 or at t = 2? We emphasize that it is risk about
consumption, and not income, that is at issue, so that there is no apparent planning
advantage to having the coin tossed early. According to the standard additive power
utility model ( = ), the time of resolution of the given risk is a matter of indierence.
But not so more generally for recursive utility. For the specication (1){(2), it is well
known that early resolution of a given risk (here tossing the coin at t = 1) is always
3preferable if and only if
1    = RRA >
1
EIS
= 1   : (3)
This condition is satised by the parameter values typically used in LRR models where
both EIS and RRA are typically taken to exceed 1. Moreover, there is clear intuition
that nonindierence to temporal resolution of risk might matter in matching asset
market data: because long-run risks are not resolved until much later, they are treated
dierently, and penalized more heavily, than are current risks thus permitting a large
risk premium to emerge even when shocks to current consumption are small. This begs
the question whether the dierential treatment required to match asset returns data is
plausible, which is obviously a quantitative question and calls for evidence about the
attitude towards temporal resolution.
We are not aware of any market-based or experimental evidence that might help
with a quantitative assessment.2 In principle, the attitude towards the temporal reso-
lution of risk may underlie behavior in many multi-period settings. However, it is not
clear how to disentangle the attitude towards the psychic benet of early resolution of
consumption risk, which is the issue at hand, from either the instrumental benet of
early resolution of income risk, which is plausibly more directly observable at the micro
level, or the pricing of consumption risk which is observable from asset market data.3
Of course, the approach of the long-run risk literature yields information about the
2The small experimental literature that we are aware of, see, e.g., Ahlbreht and Weber (1996),
Brown and Kim (forthcoming), and references therein, focuses on whether individuals prefer early
or late resolution, not on the strength of this preference. Our paper may provide stimulus for more
work along these lines; an important question is how to extrapolate from the experimentally feasible
risks and time intervals. There is also some evidence from eld experiments that many individuals
choose not to learn their test results for various diseases, see, e.g., Thornton (2008) and Oster et. al.
(2013); given the clear instrumental value of information this implies that the psychic benet of early
resolution is negative; however, it seems even harder to extrapolate from health outcomes that those
studies focus on to consumption outcomes that are relevant here.
3There is a literature that seeks to understand risk pricing across maturities (see e.g. Hansen,
Heaton and Li, 2008, and Hansen and Scheinkman 2009). In particular, Binsbergen, Brandt and
Koijen (2012) use data on dividend strips prices to show that the the long run risks model (as well
as other classic models) have counterfactual predictions for the pricing of securities with varying
maturities. Since there seem to be no parameterizations of these models that can resolve these puzzles
and simultaneously match the moments addressed by Bansal Yaron (2004), the work of Binsbergen
et. al. (2012) is complementary to ours in that it provides motivation for search for alternative
(endowment and/or preference) models.
4former under the assumption of Epstein-Zin utility and a suitable endowment process.
However, our objective is to judge whether this approach is a good one. To do so,
we suggest a simple thought experiment that through introspection may help to judge
plausibility of the parameter values used in the LRR literature. Thought experiments
and introspection play a role also in assessing risk aversion parameters (see, for exam-
ple, Kandel and Stambaugh, 1990, 1991, Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991, and Rabin, 2000).
In the latter context one considers questions of the form \how much would you pay
for the following hypothetical gamble?". Here we ask instead \what fraction of your
consumption stream would you give up in order for all risk to be resolved next month?"
We call this fraction the timing premium and study its dependence on the parameters
of the model.
A picture that seems to emerge is that models that assume high persistence of the
consumption process (as in Bansal{Yaron, 2004) tend to imply a timing premium of
the order of 25{30%, much higher than in an i.i.d. model where it is of the order
of 7{10%. The intuition that persistence inates the timing premium is corroborated
with the rare disaster model: assuming high persistence of the jump process (as in
Wachter, 2013) implies a timing premium of the order of 40%, much higher than in
the i.i.d. model of Barro (2009), where it is around 20%.
Section 2 presents our theoretical and numerical results for the LRR model. Sec-
tion 3 oers an extended discussion of the results framed as answers to the following
series of questions: Why pay a premium for early resolution? Is introspection pos-
sible/useful? How is the premium for early resolution related to the welfare cost of
risk (Lucas, 1987)? What is the eect of modifying the endowment process to be
i.i.d., or to correspond to rare disasters (Barro, 2006,9) or persistent rare disasters
(Wachter, 2013)? What if a nonexpected utility model of risk preferences is adopted?
Section 4 concludes and includes a brief comparison with related papers by Ai (2007)
and D'Addona and Brevik (2011).
52 How much would you pay?
The LRR consumption process
Consider a consumption process of the following form:
log
ct+1
ct
= m + xt + tWc;t+1
xt+1 = axt + 'tWx;t+1 (4)

2
t+1 = 
2 + (
2
t   
2) + wWw;t+1;
where 0 < a < 1 and Wc;t;Wx;t, and Ww;t are standard Gaussian innovations, mutually
independent and i.i.d. over time.
Here xt is a persistently varying predictable component of the drift in consumption
growth. Though ' should be thought of as much smaller than unity, small innovations
to xt are important because they aect not only consumption prospects in the short run
but also consumption for the indenite future. The parameter a determines persistence
of the expected growth rate process.
The volatility of consumption growth, represented by t, is time-varying with un-
conditional variance given by 2. The empirical importance of stochastic volatility is
emphasized by Bansal et al (2012) and Beeler and Campbell (2012). Setting  = 0 = w
turns o stochastic volatility and leads to a process with a constant variance of con-
sumption growth; Bansal and Yaron refer to this model as Case I and to the model
with stochastic volatility as Case II.
The LRR literature also distinguishes between consumption and dividends and
species a suitable process for the latter. But it is the consumption process as a whole,
and not its components, that is important here in trying to understand the nature of
preferences.
In LRR models, a consumption process similar to the above is the endowment of
a representative agent in a Lucas-style exchange economy. It is well known that there
is limited theoretical justication for the assumption of a representative agent; here
it requires that everyone have identical Epstein-Zin (hence homothetic) preferences.
Regardless, we treat the representative agent as a real individual when introspecting
about her preferences. The innite horizon can be understood as arising from a bequest
6motive, or as a rough approximation to a long but nitely-lived individual.
Denition of the timing premium
Here is the thought experiment. You are facing consumption described by (4) for
t = 0;1;::: In particular, the riskiness of consumption resolves only gradually over
time (ct and xt are realized only at time t). How much would you pay at time 0 to
have all risk resolved next period? More precisely, you are oered the option of having
all risk resolved at time 1. The cost is that you would have to relinquish the fraction
 of both current consumption and of the consumption that is subsequently realized
for every later period. What is the maximum value  for which you would be willing
to accept this oer? Call  the timing premium for the consumption process in (4).
Formally, let U0 be the utility of the consumption process in (4) with risk resolved
gradually, and let U
0 be the utility of the alternative process where all risk is resolved
at time 1. Then4

 = 1  
U0
U
0
:
Theoretical derivation for EIS= 1
The magnitude of EIS, particularly whether it is less than or greater than 1, is a source
of debate. Bansal and Yaron argue for an elasticity larger than 1 (in fact, EIS > 1 is
important for the empirical performance of their model). Because closed-form solutions
are not available for EIS 6= 1, we compute values of the timing premium numerically
below. However, rst we derive a closed-form expression for the timing premium under
the assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution and restricting attention to the
case of constant volatility for consumption growth.
Continuation utilities of the consumption process in (4), with risk resolved gradu-
ally, solve a recursive relation. Guess and verify that utility is given by
logU0 = logc0 +

1   a
x0 +

1   
m +

2
2
1   

1 +
'22
(1   a)2

4Utility admits an interpretation in terms of consumption perpetuities. For any consumption
process c, its utility as dened in (1)-(2) equals that level of consumption which if received in every
period and state would be indierent to c. Thus  can be described as the fraction of the consumption
perpetuity that if relinquished would just oset the benet of early resolution of risk.
7Denote by U
0 the utility of the alternative process where all risk is resolved at time 1.
Then the continuation utility U
1 at time 1 is given by
logU

1 = (1   )

logc1 +  logc2 + 
2 logc3 + :::

= logc0 + 
1
t=1
t 1 log(ct=ct 1):
Therefore, from the time 0 perspective logU
1 is normally distributed with mean logc0+
m
1  + a
1 ax0 and variance 2
1 2

1 +
'2
(1 a)2

. Conclude that
logU

0 = (1   )logc0 +  log(E0 (U

1)
)
1=
= logc0 +

1   a
x0 +

1   
m +

2
2
1   2

1 +
'22
(1   a)2

:
Accordingly, one arrives at the following expression for the timing premium:

 = 1   exp


2
22
1   2

1 +
'22
(1   a)2

.
The premium is positive, that is, early resolution is preferred, if and only if  < 0,
consistent with (3). In that case, the premium is increasing in RRA, 2, ',  and a,
as one would expect. The rst column of Table 1 gives a sense of the quantitative
meaning of this formula for the parameter values (other than EIS) specied in Bansal
and Yaron (2004) for a monthly frequency. (The risk premium described in the last
row is dened in Section 3.)
Numerical results
For values of EIS dierent than 1, we rely on numerical methods. To obtain the value
of U0 we note that the value function U in (1) can be written as U(c;x;) = cH(x;),
where H : R  R+ ! R+ is a solution to the functional equation
H(x;) =

1    + e


m+x+ 2
2

Ex; (H(x
0;
0)


 1

; (5)
Ex; is the expectation conditional on x and . We discretize x and , approximate H
by a Chebyshev polynomial, and approximate the expectation by a quadrature; thus
our approximation to (5) can be written as a system of nonlinear equations. We solve
8this system using AMPL. To compute the value of early resolution U
0 we run Matlab
Monte Carlo simulations with a xed time horizon T = 2500 months (pasting U0 as
the continuation value at T).
Table 1 reports our numerical results for EIS = 1:5. Figure 1 plots the isoquants
of the timing and risk premia for the two specications and a range of preference
parameters.5
BY (but EIS=1) BY (Case I) BY (Case II)
 :0078 :0078 :0078
' :044 :044 :044
a :9790 :9790 :9790
2
w 0 0 :23  10 5
 0 0 .987
 :998 :998 :998
RRA 7:5 or 10 7:5 or 10 7:5 or 10
EIS 1 1:5 1:5
Timing Premium  20% or 27% 23% or 29% 24% or 31%
Risk Premium  38% or 48% 48% or 56% 48% or 57%
Table 1: Premia in the LRR model
5We limit RRA to be no greater than 10, the upper bound considered reasonable by Mehra and
Prescott (1985) despite the fact that in the literature many calibrated, as well as estimated (see Chen,
Favilukis, and Ludvigson, 2012), parameter values exceed 10. Those parameter values would inate
the timing premium further.
9(a) Timing Premium constant volatility (b) Risk Premium constant volatility
(c) Timing Premium stochastic volatility (d) Risk Premium stochastic volatility
Figure 1: Premium isoquant maps for the LRR model. The red dots denote the
calibrated values of EIS and RRA. Other parameters are as in Table 1.
103 Discussion and perspective
Why pay a premium?
Would you give up 25 or 30% of your lifetime consumption in order to have all risk
resolved next month? Keep in mind that it is risk about consumption that is at issue
rather than risk about income or security returns. Thus early resolution does not have
any apparent instrumental value. Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979) suggest that an
instrumental value might arise because of an unmodeled underlying planning problem.
Essentially, there are more primitive preferences dened over deeper variables that
are the ultimate source of satisfaction; utility dened on consumption is an indirect
utility function, and early resolution has value for reasons familiar from Spence and
Zeckhauser (1972), for example. This sounds plausible in theory, but one needs a more
concrete story in order to believe that it could generate a sizable timing premium.6
At a psychic level, early resolution of risk may reduce anxiety. However, anxiety is
plausibly more important when risk must be endured for a long time. Therefore, the
risk premium required for bearing a lottery is greater the longer is the time that the
individual has to live with the anxiety of not knowing how the lottery will be resolved.
In other words, the willingness to bear a given risk declines as the date of resolution
approaches, a form of dynamic inconsistency. However, such dynamic inconsistency is
precluded when utility is recursive and thus anxiety cannot be a rationale for a timing
premium given the utility functions considered here. (This argument is due to Grant et
al, 2000; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; and Epstein, 2008.) To the extent that introspection
is based in part on considerations of anxiety, stated timing premia overstate premia
that are consistent with LRR.
For perspective, note that modeling nonindierence to the temporal resolution of
risk is the objective in the Kreps and Porteus papers. Such nonindierence is plausible
in theory as a property of `rational' preferences. Further, Epstein and Zin (1989)
show that permitting a nonzero timing premium has the modeling benet of allowing
a partial separation between EIS and RRA. Thus even if one is skeptical about the
6Ergin and Sarver (2012) characterize behavior, in terms of choice between `lotteries over sets of
lotteries', that indicates (or can be represented via) a hidden planning problem. It remains to see if
this work will help in assessing the magnitudes of timing premia.
11descriptive importance of a nonzero timing premium, one might view its use as a cost
of separating EIS and RRA.7 How costly is a quantitative question. Similarly, it is
a quantitative issue whether nonindierence to timing makes sense as an important
component of an empirical model. But applied papers using Epstein-Zin utility have
accepted such nonindierence uncritically.
Is introspection possible? useful?
One might question whether introspection is possible or reliable given the articial
nature of the question posed in the thought experiment: how much would you pay to
have your lifetime risk resolved next month, keeping in mind that you cannot use that
information. But starkness of the question arguably helps introspection. For example,
one might feel strongly, as we do, \why should I give up 25% ... just to know earlier,
when I can't even use that information?" In fact, it is arguably easier to introspect
than if one is allowed to use the information to reoptimize, in which case self assessment
of the timing premium would involve introspection about all of substitutability, risk
aversion and early resolution, as well as about the available nancial instruments and
more generally the collection of all consumption processes in an expected budget set.
Introspection is at best a matter of opinion and is inherently subjective. While we
are not arguing that a consensus is possible, we are hoping that our exercise may help
some people understand the LRR model more fully. The alternative is to leave the
modeling exercise completely undisciplined, which we nd unsatisfactory.
How is the timing premium related to the welfare cost of risk?
Perspective on the timing premium is provided by examining also what the representa-
tive agent would be willing to pay to eliminate risk entirely. Lucas (1987) introduced
such a calculation into macroeconomics as a way to measure the welfare costs of busi-
ness cycle uctuations. His conclusion that consumption risk has very small welfare
costs stimulated many others to see how dierent model specications might lead to
larger costs. Our interest here is less in the total cost of risk per se than in using the
latter to provide further perspective on the size of the timing premium. Specically,
7This has always been Epstein's view.
12are the timing premia reported in Table 1 large relative to the total welfare cost of
risk?
Consider the deterministic consumption process c = (ct) where, for every t, ct+1=ct
equals E0 (ct+1=ct), the unconditional mean of consumption growth that is implied by
the LRR process (4). The indicated mean is given by
logE0 (ct+1=ct) = m + a
tx0 +
2
2

1 + '
t 1
i=0a
2i
.
Therefore let c be dened by c0 = c0 and
log(ct+1=ct) = m + a
tx0 +
2
2

1 + '
t 1
i=0a
2i
.
Its utility at time 0 is U0. Whenever  < 1, risk is costly (U0 > U0) and the cost may
be measured by the risk premium , where8
 = 1   U0=U0:
The last row of Table 1 shows the welfare costs implied by the LRR model. For the
parameter values used by Bansal and Yaron, an individual giving up roughly 50% of
her deterministic consumption ct in every period would still be no worse o than with
the long-run risk process in (4).
It can be veried further that, as one would expect,
U0 > U

0 > U0 if  < 0.
This suggests the following decomposition:
U0
U0
=
U0
U
0

U
0
U0
,
whereby the total cost of risk is decomposed into the cost of bearing risk that is
resolved `late' (after time 1), and the cost of bearing risk all of which is resolved `early'
8Lucas uses 
1  to measure the benet of eliminating risk rather than  to measure its cost. The
dierence between the two measures parallels the dierence between the compensating variation (used
here) and the equivalent variation (used by Lucas) of a policy change.
13(at time 1). The relative importance of the rst factor is given by
U
0=U0
U0=U0
=
U
0
U0
=
1   
1   .
For the parameter values in Table 1, the indicated ratio is between .62 and .77. Thus,
between 2/3 and 3/4 of the cost (in constant consumption perpetuity) of risk is at-
tributable to the cost of late resolution.
What is the role of the endowment process?
The numbers presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 depend on the parameters of the
endowment process and in particular on the degree of persistence.9 To examine the
importance of persistence and to oer perspective on the improved t of asset market
data provided by the LRR model, we compare its timing premia to those implied by
the benchmark i.i.d. model.10 An i.i.d. growth process for consumption is a workhorse
model, ts U.S. data well and is hard to distinguish statistically from the LRR process.
It is assumed, for example, in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Calvet and Fisher (2007),
where dividends are separated from consumption, and in Barberis et al (2001).
RRA n EIS 1:5 1 :2 :1
10 9:5% 7:8% 1:0% 0:0%
7:5 6:8% 5:6% 0:4%  0:5%
5 4:3% 3:5% 0:0%  0:8%
2 1:2% 0:9%  0:9%  1:1%
1 0:4% 0:0%  1:0%  1:2%
Table 2: Timing Premia for IID Growth Rate
Table 2 assumes  = :998, and that log(ct+1=ct) is i.i.d. N (m;2), with m = :0015
and 2 = :00007. These latter values are roughly consistent with the annual mean
(1:8%) and standard deviation (2:9%) for real per-capita consumption growth used by
9Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2012) use higher volatility persistence,  = :999. Our algorithm failed
to nd a solution to the value function. Hansen, Heaton, Lee, and Roussanov, (2007, Section 5.3)
study a continuous time model where volatility follows a Feller square root process; they nd an upper
bound on volatility persistence beyond which the value function does not exist.
10The next subsection examines yet another endowment process.
14Bansal and Yaron (2004) to calibrate their model. Comparison with Table 1 shows
that timing premia here are considerably smaller than for the LRR model.
Rare disasters
Another specication of the endowment process that is prominent in the asset pricing
literature is based on rare disasters. Barro (2009) also uses Epstein{Zin utility but he
assumes an i.i.d. consumption process where in every period there is a small probability
p of a negative shock that shrinks consumption by the factor bt.11 Specically, the
consumption process has the following representation:
log
ct+1
ct
= m + Wc;t+1 + log(1   bt)Wd;t+1;
where m is mean consumption growth, Wc;t+1  N(0;1), Wd;t+1  Bernoulli(p), and
bt follows a categorical distribution of disaster sizes obtained from data.12 All those
random variables are mutually independent and i.i.d. over time.
Wachter introduces persistence into this model by assuming that the disaster prob-
ability varies over time. Specically, she assumes that Wd;t+1  Bernoulli(pt), where
pt = 1   e t and  follows the square root process
t+1 = (1   )t +   + 
p
tt+1;
where   is the mean value of ,  measures persistence, and  measures the standard
deviation.13
The parameter values used by Barro (2009) are for an annual frequency: RRA = 4,
EIS = 2, p = :017, m = :025,  = 0:02, and  = 0:951. The distribution of bt has
mean :29, minimum :15, maximum :73 and was obtained from the author. With these
parameter values (and T = 200 for the Monte Carlo simulation) the computed value
of the timing premium is 18% and the risk premium is 29%.14
11He follows Barro (2006) and Rietz (1988).
12See also Barro and Jin (2011) who t power laws to the distribution of disaster sizes and Tsai
and Wachter (2013) who allow for rare booms as well as rare disasters.
13Wachter's model is in continuous time. We use a discretized version of her process.
14For comparison, we also computed the values for the monthly parametrization and they are close:
19% and 29% respectively.
15We discretize the parameter values used by Wachter (2013): RRA = 3, EIS = 1,
  = 0:0355,  = 0:08,  = 0:067, m = 0:0252,  = 0:02, and  = 0:988. The
categorical distribution of bt has mean :22, minimum :1, maximum :68 and was obtained
from the author. With these parameter values (and T = 200 for the Monte Carlo
simulation) the computed value of the timing premium is 42% and the risk premium
is 65%.15 It is instructive to compare these premium values to those obtained in the
model without persistence: setting  = 0 and  = 1 yields the timing premium of 22%
and the risk premium of 46%.16 Thus, allowing for long run shocks to the probability
of disasters heavily inates both premia.
What about other preference parameter values?
Are there parameter values that allow for sensible values of the timing premium and
at the same time provide a good t of the asset pricing data? Surely, setting EIS in
the vicinity of the reciprocal of RRA leads to a small timing premium. With a high
RRA needed to accommodate a high equity premium, this would require that EIS
be signicantly below one. However, Bansal and Yaron (2004) point out that in their
model, EIS below 1 would lead to excessive levels and/or volatility for the risk-free rate.
This is also true in the variable rare disaster model of Wachter (2013). In addition,
Barro (2009) points out that EIS below 1 leads to the counterfactual prediction that
an increase in economic uncertainty would lead to an increase in price dividend ratios.
It is possible that there exists a model of the endowment process that ts asset pricing
data well with EIS smaller than one; however, we are not aware of such a process.
More general risk preferences
In (1)-(2) and in the Kreps-Porteus model more generally, risk preferences are in the
vNM class. Epstein and Zin (1989) describe a more general class of recursive utility
functions in which risk preferences that are consistent with the Allais paradox are also
permitted. Some of these specications have been used to address the equity premium
15As in the case of the Bansal{Yaron model, we compute the value of early resolution by Monte
Carlo simulations. To compute the value of gradual resolution we use value iteration.
16The dierence between these numbers and those that we obtain for Barro's specication can be
accounted for by the dierent preference parameters and slightly dierent empirical distributions of
disaster sizes.
16and related puzzles (references are given below). Therefore, we explore briey the
quantitative implications of such generalizations for timing premia.
To preserve simplicity while generalizing preferences, as well as for the convenience
of closed forms and for the clarity of intuition delivered thereby, we simplify the en-
dowment process and assume that the (log) growth rate is i.i.d. with log(ct+1=ct)
distributed as N (m;2). Generalize (2) and consider utility dened by:
logUt = (1   )logct +  log(Ut+1). (6)
Here () is the certainty equivalent of random future utility using its conditional
distribution at time t.17 Assume that (x) = x for any deterministic random variable x,
that  respects rst-order and second-order stochastic dominance, and that  is linearly
homogeneous (constant relative risk aversion).
It is convenient to use the renormalized certainty equivalent , where for any
positive random variable X and associated distribution,  (logX)  log(X). Then
(see the appendix) the timing premium is given in closed-form by  = 1 exp( ),
where
  
(
1
0 
t log(ct+1=ct))   (1   )
 1 
 (log(c1=c0)). (7)
For the expected utility-based certainty equivalent,  (logX) = 1
 logE(X
t+1), and
one obtains the Epstein-Zin implied timing premium; denote the corresponding  by
EZ.
As an alternative, consider the following disappointment aversion certainty equiv-
alent:18 Fix 0 <   1, and for any positive random variable X (with distribution P),
dene da (X) implicitly by
logda (X) = E log(X)  
 

 1   1
Z
xda(X)
(logda(X)   logx)dP(x),
17In general it depends on the information at t, but with the i.i.d. assumption such time dependence
can be safely suppressed.
18The model is due to Gul (1991). For applications to nance, see Epstein and Zin (2001), Ang et
al (2005). Routledge and Zin (2010) present and apply a generalization, which is investigated further
empirically by Bonomo et al (2011). See also Epstein and Zin (1990) and Bekaert et al (1997).
17or equivalently, (let Y = logX and Q its induced distribution),


da (Y ) = EY  
 

 1   1
Z
y
da(Y )
(

da (Y )   y)dQ(y). (8)
The interpretation is that outcomes of X that are disappointing because they fall
below the certainty equivalent are penalized relative to E log(X). If  = 1, then
(X) = E log(X) and, when substituted into (6), one obtains the expected utility
model where RRA = EIS = 1. Accordingly, nonindierence to timing arises herein
only from the disappointment factor when  < 1. Because the latter adds to risk
aversion, the eective degree of risk aversion is greater than 1. We compare this way
of increasing risk aversion to using Epstein-Zin utility with  < 0.
We show in the appendix that the dierence  in (7), written now da, can be
expressed in the form
da =
m   
da (log(c1=c0))
1   
 
1  

1   
1 + 
1=2!
, (9)
which expression involves the certainty equivalent of the single period gamble only.
Compare EZ and da to see the diering implications for timing premia of the ex-
pected utility versus disappointment aversion risk preferences. A meaningful compari-
son requires that the respective parameters  and  be suitably related. For example,
suppose that the two certainty equivalents assign the same value to the distribution of
log(c1=c0). Then substitute 
da (log(c1=c0)) = m + 1
2  2 into (9) to deduce that
da =
 
1  

1   
1 + 
1=2!
1 + 

EZ ' 2EZ. (10)
Roughly, disappointment aversion implies timing premia twice as large as those re-
ported in Table 2 when  is calibrated as described to  =  9; 4; 1.
An alternative calibration is to assume that the two certainty equivalents assign
the same value to the distribution of 1
0 t log(ct+1=ct). Then similar reasoning leads
to the relation
da =
1

 
1 + 
1   
1=2
  1
!
EZ ' 30EZ, (11)
18and hence to much larger timing premia under disappointment aversion. (For example,
the timing premium for  that corresponds to  =  1 is about 23%.) Thus with either
calibration, timing premia are larger than with Epstein-Zin utility.
The appendix shows that (10) and (11) are valid for a broader class of risk prefer-
ences.
4 Concluding Remarks
Though risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution have been the
subjects of careful scrutiny when calibrating preferences, the long-run risks literature
and the broader literature using recursive utility to address asset pricing puzzles have
ignored the full implications of their parameter specications. Recursive utility implies
that the temporal resolution of risk matters and a quantitative assessment of how
much it matters should be part of the calibration process. This paper is not intended
to provide an exhaustive or denitive assessment of parameters used in the literature.
Its objective is to give a sense of the magnitudes of implied timing premia and to inject
temporal resolution of risk into the discussion of the quantitative properties of LRR
and related models.
Timing premia depend on both the parameters of preference and on the nature of
the endowment process. In the latter connection, we have demonstrated that, given
Epstein-Zin utility, high persistence of the consumption process, as assumed in the
LRR literature or in a version of the rare disaster model (Wachter, 2013), inates
timing premia to levels that seem implausible to us based on introspection (20-30%
in the former case and 40% in the latter case). Though some may disagree with
this admittedly subjective judgement, we believe that we have at least alerted readers
to the need to be more cautious when calibrating asset pricing models that rely on
nonindierence to temporal resolution as a key component. There are endowment
and parameter specications that imply much smaller timing premia, but while they
can account for some asset pricing moments, they yield counterfactual predictions for
others. Another alternative is to seek a dierent model of preference. In Epstein-Zin
utility (1) and (2), the two parameters  and  govern three seemingly distinct aspects
of preference, with the result that setting them to match values for EIS and RRA yields
19timing premia that are beyond direct control of the analyst. This limitation has been
recognized from the start in (1989), but this paper may provide renewed impetus to
the search for a more exible model of preference.
For other thought experiments that reect on parameter values in the LRR model,
see D'Addona and Brevik (2011) and Ai (2007). D'Addona and Brevik assert that an
agent with Epstein-Zin utility achieves higher utility levels if he can commit to ignoring
information about the state variable xt appearing in (4). Though they describe their
results as concerning information, their analysis does not admit that interpretation:
instead of changing the information structure of the agent, they endow the agent with
a dierent consumption process that does not involve long-run risk (and has the appro-
priately adjusted unconditional variance). Thus, they de facto study aversion to auto-
correlation of consumption instead of the (conceptually distinct) preference for ignoring
information or nonindierence to the temporal resolution of risk. In a continuous-time
economy with production, Ai (2007) considers the preference for early resolution from a
quantitative perspective by asking how much consumption the agent is willing to forgo
to learn perfectly the autocorrelated component of the production process instead of
having just a noisy signal of it. Our starker thought experiment where early resolution
means that all risk is fully resolved, and the discrete-time exchange economy setting,
arguably permit a sharper focus and make it easier for introspection to operate. (See
Section 3 for our related comments on whether introspection is useful.)
An important alternative to models based on recursive utility is the external habits
model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Corresponding scrutiny of that model seems
in order. Thus far plausibility of the habits formation process assumed for the repre-
sentative agent has been judged solely by how it helps to match asset market data.
The discipline urged by Mehra and Prescott (1985) suggests that at least one should
examine also whether it seems plausible based on introspection about the quantitative
eects of past consumption on current preferences. The diculty of nding market-
based evidence concerning external habits, or about timing premia, does not justify
leaving them as "free parameters."
20A Appendix
A.1 Details for more general risk preferences
To derive (7), use the fact that utilities are given by
logU0 = logc0 + 

1
1   

 (log(c1=c0))

logU

0 = logc0 + 


(
1
0 
t log(ct+1=ct))

,
Let Y = log(c1=c0) and Y 0 = 1
0 t log(ct+1=ct). They are distributed as N (m;2)
and N

m
1 ; 2
1 2

respectively. Therefore,
Y
00 
 
1   
21=2 Y
0   m
 
1 + 
1   
1=2
  1
!
is N
 
m;
2
.
Because da (Y 00) and da (Y ) depend only on the distributions of Y 00 and Y , they must
be equal. Note that 
da satises: for all   0,


da (Y + ) = 

da (Y ) +  and 

da (Y ) = 

da (Y ), (12)
that is, it exhibits both CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) and CRRA (constant
relative risk aversion). Conclude that the two certainty equivalent values appearing in
(7) are related by the equation
 
1   
21=2 

da
 

1
0 
t log(ct+1=ct)

  

da (log(c1=c0)) (13)
= m
 
1 + 
1   
1=2
  1
!
.
The preceding, and hence also equations (10) and (11), rely only on lognormality
and on the fact that 
da satises (12). Thus the comparative analysis of timing pre-
mia applies to any certainty equivalent function satisfying the latter properties. For
example, it applies also to the following generalization of (8):


gda (Y ) = EY  
 

 1   1
Z
y
gda(Y )
(

gda (Y )   y)dQ(y),
21where 0 <   1. Here outcomes are disappointing if they are smaller than the fraction
 of the certainty equivalent. This generalization of disappointment aversion (which
corresponds to the special case  = 1) is in the spirit of that provided by Routledge
and Zin (2010).19
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